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THE NEW GERMAN SYSTEM OF RESCUING
BANKS
Christoph G. Paulus*
INTRODUCTION
It is a well known fact that Germany was also hit by the 2008 financial
market crisis. Banks, including the IKB Bank and the Hypo Real Estate
Bank, tumbled and were on the verge of going bankrupt. Dramatic,
overnight rescue operations1 became necessary. Although these operations
were indispensable for the general public’s trust in the financial system, and
thus, in the economy in general, they were also very expensive. Therefore, a
number of “fig leaves”2 were put in place to mitigate tax payers’ displeasure
with paying for the losses; yet, losing out on the gains was of only
temporary political help. Nevertheless, following the lead of the United
Kingdom and Switzerland, the German legislature decided to strengthen its
insolvency prevention measures within the banking sector. This new
legislation broke new ground, at least for Germany.3 The already existing
control mechanisms were improved; and, more importantly, entirely new
mechanisms were introduced.
These innovations may be seen primarily in relation to the general
insolvency law. Therefore, in order to fully understand the implications of
the newly enacted Restrukturierungsgesetz (Restructuring Statute,
henceforth ReSt),4 it may be useful to describe Germany’s insolvency
practice5 as it existed before the enactment of the ReSt (i.e., before January
1, 2011). Indeed, though on its surface the statute is directed towards failing
banks, it is also meant to be a test-drive for a number of features which are
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1. Ulrich Seibert, Deutschland im Herbst–Erinnerungen an die Entstehung des
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetzes im Oktober 2008, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS HOPT 2525,
2529 (Grundmann et al. eds., 2010) (Ger.).
2. See Manfred Obermüller & Karen Kuder, Die Entwicklung der Gesetzgebung zu
Bankinsolvenzen, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT [ZINSO] 2016, 2016
(2010) (Ger.) (providing a short overview of all such legislative measures). See also Gregor
Bachmann, Das neue Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 459, 460 (2010) (Ger.).
3. This step still needs to be fulfilled on the Eurogroup level. See Christoph G. Paulus, Ein
Regelungssystem zur Schaffung eines internationalen Insolvenzrechts für Staaten, 25 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR GESETZGEBUNG [ZG] 313, 319 (2010) (Ger.); Christoph G. Paulus, A Resolvency Proceeding
for Defaulting Sovereigns, 3 INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. [IILR] 1, 1 (2012).
4. Restrukturierungsgesetz [RStruktG] [Restructuring Statute], Dec. 9, 2010,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter ReSt].
5. See generally Christoph G. Paulus, The New German Insolvency Code, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J.
141 (1998); see also Christoph G. Paulus, Germany: Lessons to Learn from the Implementation of
a New Insolvency Code, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 89 (2001) (providing a general description of
Germany’s insolvency legislation).
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intended to be—sooner or later—transferred to the general insolvency law
that is applicable to all insolvent entities.6
I. THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM
Under the previous bank insolvency regime, a bank’s insolvency would
be subjected to the general insolvency law of the Insolvenzordnung
(Insolvency Ordinance, henceforth InsO).7 In theory, a bank would be
treated like any other insolvent enterprise. This scenario, however, rarely
applied because the right to file a petition was reserved exclusively for the
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Agency for
Financial Service Supervision, henceforth BaFin).8 Furthermore, in addition
to this exclusive right, BaFin was entrusted with some instruments designed
to prevent a financial institution from going bankrupt. As a result, the
application of the general insolvency law was rarely used.
In truth, the hope of applying the rescue option is (and always has been)
in vain. Banks and other financial institutions are so dependent on their
customers’ trust that any contact with an insolvency court would lead to a
run on the bank that would immediately destroy the business;9 this is true at
least in jurisdictions like Germany where the stigma of bankruptcy remains
paramount.10 While these facts demonstrate that preventive measures are
important,11 the last financial crisis showed that these instruments are not
sufficient. The new legislation seeks to make the necessary improvements.12
II. THE LACK OF A RESCUE CULTURE
The general German insolvency law draws a clear line between a courtdriven insolvency proceeding and any out of court rescue. Whereas the
former is regulated entirely by the InsO, the latter is not—which means that
in practice all measures have to be taken from, for instance, general contract

6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Ordinance], Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 2866, as amended Dec. 7, 2011, BGBL. I at 2582 (Ger.) [hereinafter InsO].
See EVA H.G. HÜPKES, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK INSOLVENCY, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 57, 117 (2000) (providing a concise
description of the previous bank insolvency system); KLAUS PANNEN, KRISE UND INSOLVENZ BEI
KREDITINSTITUTEN 113 (3rd ed. 2010).
8. See BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT, http://www.bafin.de/EN
/Home/homepage__node.html?__nnn=true (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
9. See Daniel Zimmer & Florian Fuchs, Die Bank in Krise und Insolvenz: Ansätze zur
Minderung des systemischen Risikos, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 597, 599 (2010) (Ger.) (discussing the interconnectedness of the
banking sector); see also Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at 2017.
10. See Christoph G. Paulus, Ein Kaleidoskop aus der Geschichte des Insolvenzrechts, 64
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1148, 1149 (2009) (Ger.) (providing a history of the stigma of bankruptcy
proceedings in Germany).
11. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 459.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
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law, commercial law, and some other appropriate bodies of law. This strict
distinction has come under criticism in recent years.13
Such criticism was not necessarily due to influence from the United
States, where the Chapter 11 proceeding represents a kind of archetype for
the hybrid character of a prevention and insolvency type of proceeding.
Rather, it was the development within the area of the European Insolvency
Regulation, where the German jurisdiction was confronted again and again
with the insolvency prevention measures of other states. In particular, when
German companies started to move their center of main interests (COMI) to
England in order to benefit from its Company Voluntary Arrangement, the
discussion in Germany intensified. It further intensified in 2011 when
German companies started to restructure their financial difficulties by
making use of the English Scheme of Arrangement without changing their
COMI.14 Other member states, such as Italy, Greece, and, above all, France,
have also developed elaborate pre-insolvency procedures to prevent
companies from being forced into a regular insolvency (or liquidation)
proceeding.
The discussion in Germany about the benefit or disadvantage of this
type of proceeding is still going on even despite the fact that the
forthcoming amendment to the InsO is called Gesetz zur weiteren
Erleichterung von Sanierungen für Unternehmen (Statute for the
Facilitation of Companies’ Reorganizations, henceforth ESUG).15
III. SPECIFIC INSOLVECY-RELATED ISSUES
Finally, there are a number of specific insolvency-related issues in the
present InsO, and the way it has been interpreted is the subject of (partly
long-lasting) complaints. Suffice it to mention here:


the lack of any authority to have the insolvent company’s
shareholders included within the proceeding (the abbreviation
here, the debt-equity swap);

13. See Christoph G. Paulus, Deutschlands langer Weg in die insolvenzrechtliche Moderne –
Auf der Suche nach einer Sanierungskultur (Rescue Culture), 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN
[WM] 2205, 2205 (2011) (Ger.).
14. See Christoph G. Paulus, Das englische Scheme of Arrangement – ein neues Angebot auf
dem europäischen Markt für außergerichtliche Restrukturierungen, 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1077, 1077 (2011) (Ger.); Peter Mankowski, Anerkennung englischer
Solvent Schemes of Arrangement in Deutschland, 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1201
(2011) (Ger.); Horst Eidenmüller & Tilmann Frobenius, Die internationale Reichweite eines
englischen Scheme of Arrangement, 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1210, 1219 (2011)
(Ger.).
15. Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen [ESUG] [Statute for
the Facilitation of Companies’ Reorganizations], Dec. 7, 2011, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1
[BGBL. I] at 2582 (Ger.) (providing exclusively intra-insolvency measures).
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the notorious German problem of having no ability to predict
the insolvency administrator because the appointment is left to
the exclusive, and jealously kept, power of the insolvency
judge; and
the multiplicity of insolvency courts and the resulting lack of
expertise among many insolvency judges.

A. THE DESCRIPTION
The ReSt is designed to overcome all these deficiencies.16 It consists of
a package of different measures, of which the four most important shall be
discussed in this paper. Even though these and several other measures were
discussed widely in the European context, and even though the European
Commission plans to come up sooner or later with its own rescue
instrument,17 Germany felt the need to expedite the process by setting up its
own legislation. It remains to be seen whether the ReSt will need
adaptations or amendments once Europe has acted.
1. Reorganization of Credit Institutions
Part 1 of the ReSt contains the abovementioned test-drives; it is called
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (Statute for the
Reorganization of Credit Institutions, henceforth CIReSt).18 It consists of
two parts, of which the first, Sanierungsverfahren (rescue proceeding),19 is
applicable to all credit institutions, whereas the second,
Reorganisationsverfahren (reorganization proceeding),20 is reserved for
those few institutions whose failure and breakdown would create a systemic
risk.
a. Commonalities
Section 1 of CIReSt is a general statute which applies to both types of
proceedings. With respect to CIReSt’s applicability, it defines in paragraph
1 which credit institutions are addressed. Accordingly, only those
institutions, which fall under the definition in section 1 of
16. Other issues, particularly taxation issues, remain unresolved. Hans-Jürgen A. Feyerabend,
Stephan Behnes & Marcus Helios, Steuerliche Aspekte des Banken-Restrukturierungsgesetzes, 64
DER BETRIEB [DB], supplement 4, 30, 30 (2011) (Ger.).
17. See Klaus J. Hopt, Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europäischen und internationalen
Finanzmarktarchitektur, 12 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 1401, 1401
(2009) (Ger.). See also Urs Zulauf, Schweizer Bankensanierungsrecht – geeignet für
systemrelevante Banken?: Ein Vergleich mit den Vorschlägen in Deutschland, 64 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1525 (2010) (Ger.) (discussing the system in Switzerland).
18. Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz [KredReorgG] [Statute for the Reorganization of
Credit Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1900 (Ger.)
[hereinafter CIReSt].
19. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b.
20. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.c.
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Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act, henceforth BAct) and which have their
seat within Germany, are included. This excludes, for instance, financial
service providers, investment trusts, and foreign credit institutions. Section
1, paragraph 3 of CIReSt serves the purpose of accelerating both
proceedings by ordering that all judicial decisions be given by judicial
resolution (Beschluss) rather than a full-fledged decision; this means that,
pursuant to the common terminology of the Zivilprozessordnung (Civil
Procedure Ordinance, henceforth CPO),21 oral proceedings are dispensable.
Moreover, the same paragraph decrees that all those resolutions are
incontestable, which means that they are binding as soon as they are issued.
Taken together with the fact that the Frankfurt Court of Appeal has
exclusive jurisdiction, these rules are likely to become a model for
commercial insolvency law in general.
There is one more noteworthy commonality of the two types of
proceedings that is meant to serve as an incentive to make use of them: If a
credit institution petitions for either one of the proceedings, it is relieved
from its duty to notify BaFin of its inability to pay or its overindebtedness.22
b. Rescue Proceeding
Sections 2 through 6 of CIReSt deal with the rescue proceeding. It is,
like the reorganization procedure,23 an optional procedure which was
originally intended to be available to all German credit institutions
whenever they felt the need for a rescue attempt. This instrument should,
thus, have been available at any time, even long before insolvency. In the
last minute of the legislative process, however, this unrestricted time
requirement was changed by inserting into section 2, paragraph 1 of CIReSt
the request that certain requirements of section 45 of the BAct be fulfilled.
This set of eligibility requirements reflects the typical German distrust in
the responsible handling of legal instruments by private parties;24 obviously,
it was feared that, without such restrictions, the rescue proceeding might be
abused. This fear is even more irksome as CIReSt explicitly states: “The
rescue plan might contain all sorts of measures suitable for the rescue of the
credit institution as long as they do not touch the rights of third parties.”25

21. Zivilprozessordnug [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Ordinance], Jan. 30, 1877,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBl.] at 83, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 3044 (Ger.)
[hereinafter CPO].
22. Under the Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act), an institution that becomes insolvent or
overindebted is required to immediately report this fact to the Federal Banking Supervisory
Office. Kreditwesengesetz [KWG] [Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1
[BGBL. I] at 2776, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 3044, § 46b (Ger.) [hereinafter BAct].
23. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.c.
24. This distrust can also be described as a lack of a rescue culture in Germany.
25. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 2, para. 2, sentence 2 (Ger.) (translated by author).
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Note that such third parties are, in particular, creditors! But let us go step by
step.
The rescue procedure begins with a petition by the credit institution to
BaFin. It must (1) indicate the distressed situation, (2) be accompanied by
an elaborated rescue plan, and (3) contain a proposal of a qualified rescue
adviser. The rescue advisor can even be a member of the board of directors
of the institution.26 It is explicitly provided that an advisor is not
disqualified by his or her participation in the drafting of the rescue plan.27 If
BaFin deems this application appropriate, it shall immediately file a petition
with the (exclusively competent) Court of Appeal in Frankfurt to open the
rescue proceeding. BaFin appends to this petition its own assessment of the
rescue plan, in addition to its evaluation of the rescue adviser; both BaFin
and the court have the right to propose a different advisor.28
The rescue adviser’s position and competence is comparable to that of
the preliminary insolvency administrator in the commercial insolvency area.
The main task of the rescue advisor is to implement the rescue plan.29 For
this purpose, the adviser is granted a number of powers—ranging from the
right to enter into an investigation within the credit institution over its right
to participate in meetings to the right to give instructions about the
management. In addition to these generally existing powers of the adviser,
the Court of Appeal can order further measures if required; these may range
from inhibiting directors from further action, to obliging the directors to
appoint the adviser to the board, to examining the appropriateness of the
management’s salaries.
This description of the rescue procedure makes it clear that its essential
feature is the rescue plan. It may, for instance, provide for increasing equity
or adding borrowed capital, reducing the labor force of the institution, or
selling certain parts of that institution’s commercial enterprise. As
aforementioned, this plan, however, must not contain any regulations which
would interfere with third parties’ rights. Nevertheless, there is one explicit
exemption to that, pursuant to section 2, paragraph 2 of CIReSt: the plan
may include a clause which grants a super priority to rescue new creditors30
over existing creditors, provided that, despite the rescue efforts, an
insolvency proceeding takes place within the next three years, and that the

26. Id. § 3, para. 3.
27. Id. § 3, para. 1. These rules are understandable after considering the predominant, general
practice of German insolvency courts, which never appoint an administrator who has had any
interference with the debtor before the filing of the petition. The ESUG is now about to introduce
rules which will overcome this problem in the general commercial insolvency context.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 6.
30. It is not entirely clear whether this privilege is applicable also for credits given by
shareholders of that credit institution. Pursuant to the general insolvency law, shareholder credits
are subordinated. See, e.g., Bachmann, supra note 2, at 461; Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at
2019.
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thus privileged credit frame does not exceed the sum of 10 percent of the
equity capital. In light of these restrictions and, even more importantly, in
light of the notorious German antipathy against the publicity of one’s own
financial distress,31 it is highly dubious that this type of procedure will ever
be used by any credit institution.32
c. Reorganization Proceeding
The reorganization proceeding is much more elaborate; it evokes, in
many respects, the so-called plan proceeding of sections 217 through 269 of
the InsO, which itself is a modified version of the U.S. Chapter 11
proceeding. But the reorganization proceeding refines the plan proceeding,
in areas where past experience has shown that changes are necessary, by
accelerating the proceeding by (1) limiting the option to appeal, (2)
including the shareholders, (3) broadening of the debtor-in-possession
option, and (4) possibly limiting the proceeding to the main creditors.
Like the rescue proceeding, the reorganization proceeding is just an
option granted to German credit institutions. It is up to the institution
whether to make use of it and whether to use it instead of a rescue
proceeding or thereafter; the proceeding is, accordingly, a voluntary one.33
This option, however, is very much restricted in its applicability. Pursuant
to section 7, paragraph 2 of CIReSt, it is reserved exclusively34 for credit
institutions which are, according to section 48b of the BAct, of systemic
relevance.35 The following are required: (1) a threat in the present situation
to the further existence of that credit institution36 which might (2) ultimately
lead to a threat to the entire system.37 Because of the centrality of this
“nerve system,” special remedies are necessary, and therefore, the debtor is
allowed to interfere with third parties’ rights in this type of procedure.

31. This particular feature is best visible in the German law of secured transactions.
32. See Gunnar Schuster & Lars Westpfahl, Neue Wege zur Bankensanierung – Ein Beitrag
zum Restrukrurierungsgesetz (Teil I), 64 DER BETRIEB [DB] 221, 223 (2011) (Ger.). Obermüller
& Kuder, supra note 2, at 2018 (offering a more optimistic position).
33. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.
34. This restriction can rightly be criticized, see Bachmann, supra note 2, at 463.
35. In Germany, it is somewhat inappropriate to limit the discussion of systemic relevance
(and its twin, “too big to fail”) to credit institutions. Systemic relevance is not confined to the
banking sector. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008). See also
Peter Kindler, Finanzkrise und Finanzmarktregulierung – Ein Zwischenruf zum 68. Deutschen
Juristentag, 63 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2465, 2467 (2010) (Ger.). See
Zimmer & Fuchs, supra note 9, at 600.
36. This requirement is not exactly identical with the commercial insolvency law’s “imminent
insolvency” of section 18 of the InsO. It is rather a non-compliance with certain fundamental
conditions of the BAct; see Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 225.
37. See Klaus Pannen, Das geplante Restrukurierungsgesetz für Kreditinstitute, 13
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT [ZINSO] 2026, 2029 (2010) (Ger.).
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The reorganization proceeding, too, begins with a petition by the
respective credit institution38 to BaFin, which again must be accompanied
by a reorganization plan. As with the rescue proceeding, here, too, an
adviser shall be nominated, and is called the reorganization adviser. The
reorganization adviser can be member of the board of directors of the
institution, or the drafter of the plan. Pursuant to section 13 of CIReSt, the
effect of this petition is that any contractual agreements with the credit
institution cannot be terminated until the end of the subsequent business
day. It is to be assumed, however, that irrespective of section 13’s provision
that agreements to the contrary shall be deemed to be void, this protection
can quite easily be undermined by adjusting, accordingly, the respective
contractual clauses to earlier automatic termination events.39
After receiving the petition, BaFin examines whether the requirements
of section 48b of the BAct are fulfilled and whether the reorganization
proceeding appears to be appropriate. Thereby, BaFin is granted broad
discretion, but it is to be assumed that BaFin will decide only after
consultation with the Bundesbank (German Federal Bank). If the decision is
in the affirmative, BaFin files the petition with the abovementioned Court
of Appeal, which itself reexamines the requirements of systemic relevance
and the legitimacy of the reorganization plan.
What the legitimacy of the reorganization plan means is regulated in
sections 8 through 13 of CIReSt. Accordingly, the plan consists of two
parts: a descriptive part and a constructive part, which is similar to section
220 of the InsO. The descriptive part provides information to all
stakeholders on the status quo and the effects of the reorganization plan. In
contrast, the constructive part is where one finds the interference with the
creditors’ rights. For instance, “haircuts,” a moratorium, securitization, or
any other restructuring of existing debts (e.g., by providing for a credit
frame for privileging new creditors) will be inserted into this part of the
plan.40 The same is true for a debt-equity swap, the details of which are
included in section 9 of CIReSt. Note that there is a duty to adequately
compensate the previous shareholders41 and that a debt-equity swap is
dependent on the consent of every affected creditor.
Finally, pursuant to section 11 of CIReSt, the constructive part of the
reorganization plan might also provide for a spin-off of the credit
institution’s means, in whole or in part, in an already existing or newly
created entity. This option, however, must be designed in a way that does
38. If a previous rescue proceeding was unsuccessful, this application has to be made by the
rescue adviser.
39. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 225.
40. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 12 (Ger.).
41. The adequacy of the compensation can be examined by at least one independent auditor
who is selected and appointed by the court. It is debatable whether the adequacy is to be
determined on the basis of a going concern or of a liquidation. See Obermüller & Kuder, supra
note 2, at 2019; Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 227.

2011]

The New German System of Rescuing Banks

179

not interfere with existing netting systems.42 Furthermore, section 23 of
CIReSt determines that such a spin-off must not affect any collateral or
payment and settlement system.
Creditors of the respective credit institution whose rights are affected
by any of the interferences in the plan’s constructive part are requested to
lodge their claims with the reorganization adviser. In a special examination
meeting, these claims are examined and discussed if the adviser disputes
their legitimacy. The result of the claims’ examination also determines the
creditors’ voting rights.
With respect to the reorganization’s acceptance, the procedure is again
familiar as it strongly resembles the commercial insolvency law’s plan
proceeding. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal holds a meeting at which the
plan and the voting rights are to be discussed and at which a vote will be
cast.43 The voting takes place in classes.44 As a result, only creditors
similarly situated can be put together in one class. Insofar as shareholders’
rights are affected by the reorganization plan, they are to vote in a prior,
separate shareholders’ meeting.45 This is deemed to be necessary because of
the European Second Company Law Directive46 and the respective
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.47 The details of both voting
mechanisms and their potential cram down are regulated in sections 17
through 19 of CIReSt.48
If the end result is acceptance of the plan, the Court of Appeal will
double-check the correctness of the procedure and will then ultimately
confirm the plan.49 From there, the provisions of the constructive part of
that plan will enter into effect.
2. Strengthening the Supervision
Whereas the rescue and the reorganization proceeding, as described in
the previous section, are left to the respective credit institutions or their
directors, the second part of the ReSt demonstrates a certain distrust of this
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Zimmer & Fuchs, supra note 9, at 617 (discussing the insolvency protection function).
CIReSt, supra note 18, § 16 (Ger.).
Id. § 8.
Id. § 18.
Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EEC). See Horst Eidenmüller & Andreas
Engert, Reformperspektiven einer Umwandlung von Fremd- in Eigenkapital (Debt-Equity Swap)
im Insolvenzplanverfahren, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 541, 547 (2009)
(Ger.).
47. See cases C-19/90 & C-20/90, Karella v. Minister for Indus., Energy & Tech., 1991 E.C.R.
I-2691 (Sixth Chamber); case C-381/89, Sindesmos Melon tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklisias v.
Greek State, 1992 E.C.R. I-2111 (Second Council Directive); case C-441/93, Pafitis v. Trapeza
Kentrikis Ellados AE, 1996 E.C.R. I-1347 (Second Council Directive); case C-373/97, Diamantis
v. Dimosio (Greek State), 2000 E.C.R. I-1705 (Sixth Chamber).
48. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 17, para. 2, sentence 2 (Ger.) (providing for creditors); id. § 18
(providing for shareholders); id. § 19 (stating that all groups have to agree).
49. Id. § 20.
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kind of party autonomy. As a consequence of the deficiencies recognized
during the financial crisis of 2008, this part increases BaFin’s existing
arsenal of protective measures to a considerable degree.50 Accordingly,
most51 of the measures relating to those voluntary tools can be imposed by
BaFin if it is of the opinion that those steps should be taken. For this
purpose, it can even appoint a Sonderbeauftragten (special adviser) and
entrust the advisor with all the authority thought to be appropriate in that
particular case. This implies that the abovementioned voluntariness is
reinforced by what might be called “gentle force” because the voluntary
steps can be imposed anyway by BaFin.
But there are even further reaching instruments that BaFin is now
permitted to use. Most noteworthy is the Übertragungsanordnung (transfer
order)—the power to transfer a credit institution’s capital, in full or in part,
to a private bank or a public bridge bank. Such a step will facilitate the
stabilization of that institution under the umbrella of the new bank whereas
the “bad part” is separated. It is said that similar innovations are planned to
be adopted through European legislation; however, the German legislature
felt the need for prompt action and did not wait for Europe. The idea behind
this approach is to rescue the “good bank” in the hands of the transferee
whereas the “bad bank” is left behind with the transferor and doomed to be
liquidated.52 Note that a transfer is admissible just with respect to the
“good” assets;53 it is, thus, impossible to transfer toxic assets or the like to a
“bad bank.”
The transfer order is only permitted for credit institutions that have their
seat in Germany and that are of systemic importance.54 Beyond this parallel
with the aforementioned reorganization proceeding, the scope of the order’s
applicability stretches to holding companies and other higher-ranked group
institutions. Therefore, this tool appears to be more efficient than the
voluntary one,55 but is somewhat hedged by the imposition that a transfer
order can be imposed only as ultima ratio (i.e., there must be no other
equally efficient remedy be available). This is an expression of the
proportionality principle.56

50. See Dirk Auerbach & Kirsten Donner, Änderungen bei den aufsichtlichen
Eingriffsinstrumenten des KWG durch das Restrukturierungsgesetz, 64 DER BETRIEB [DB],
supplement 4, 17, 17 (2011) (Ger.).
51. Unfortunately, BaFin has no power to prescribe a credit institution to come up with a
reorganization plan. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 463.
52. See Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at 2021.
53. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 467.
54. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.a.
55. If necessary, BaFin might interrupt a reorganization proceeding and issue a transfer order
as it may, the other way round, make the issuance of the transfer order dependant on the credit
institution’s presentation of a reorganization plan which is apt to overcome the threat of
insolvency within six weeks.
56. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 282.
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Pursuant to section 48c, paragraph 5 of the BAct, the transferee must be
a legal person which has its headquarters within Germany. The transfer is
admissible only when the transferee declares its consent in a notarially
certified document. It is to be assumed that transfer orders will be issued
only in extremely urgent cases; therefore, there might not be enough time to
wait for such consent of the transferee. After all, it is an important business
measure and, accordingly, the transferee must conduct much due diligence
in order to take over an entire credit institution, or just parts of it. Thus, it is
likely that the most attractive transferee will be a newly created bridge
bank.57 Its “emptiness” alleviates the problems potentially arising out of the
evaluation of the transfer’s consideration. Hence, the creation of stock
bridge banks will be an important task.58
Since it is the goal of any transfer order to save those parts of the credit
institution which are of systemic relevance, the selection of the assets to be
transferred is of significant importance. Section 48k, paragraph 2 of the
BAct, however, clarifies that here, too, netting systems must not be split
and that collateral must not be separated from the secured claim. Once the
transfer is perfected, it is insolvency-proof, and the transferee is immune
against any avoidance attempts.59 Its liability is, pursuant to section 48h,
paragraph 1 of the BAct, subsidiary to that of the transferor and is restricted
to the amount of the transferred liabilities which creditors presumably
would have received if the transfer had not taken place. This limitation of
risk is to be contrasted with the rule in section 48k, paragraph 3 of the
BAct, which provides for non-subsidiary liability (i.e., joint liability of
transferee and transferor for the liabilities remaining with the latter). This
liability is limited, however, to the amount that the creditors would have
received without any transfer.
Judicial remedies against such a transfer order are restricted insofar as
there is exclusive authority of the Court of Appeal in Kassel (section 48r of
the BAct), which is an administrative law court. This results because a
transfer order is an act which is subject to administrative law. Nevertheless,
when all of these rescue measures ultimately fail and, in the end, a
liquidation of a credit institution is inevitable, legislative measures provide
for a closer cooperation between the banking supervision on the one hand
and the insolvency court and administrator on the other.60

57.
58.
59.
60.

See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 469.
See discussion supra Part III.
BAct, supra note 22, § 48h, para. 2 (Ger.).
Id. § 46b, para. 3.
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3. Restructuring Fund
A further part of the ReSt is the Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz (Statute
for the Restructuring Fund, henceforth ReStF)61 which provides for the
establishment of a special fund, called Restrukturierungsfonds
(Restructuring Fund). It has a limited legal capacity and constitutes a
separate division of an already existing institution—the so-called
Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Federal Agency for Financial
Market Stabilization, henceforth FMSA).62 Its purpose is to collect financial
resources that are to be used in the future for any restructuring or windingup measures of credit institutions that are of systemic relevance.63 In order
to relieve the general taxpayer from bailouts, this fund is to be supported by
financial contributions from all credit institutions in Germany;64 the target
size of the fund is, pursuant to section 12, paragraph 10 of the ReStF, €70
billion.
The contribution rate, however, is not the same for all those institutions.
Rather, the rate is to be calculated on the basis of the institution’s particular
systemic risk. The determination of the individual institution’s risk is
influenced by various factors: the size of the institution, its
interconnectedness on the financial market, its liabilities, and possibly
further elements. This rating serves the additional purpose of functioning as
a kind of warning signal for the credit institution as it indicates its potential
risk.
The FMSA was established in 2008 in the context of the global
financial crisis, and its authority has been broadened by the ReStF. The
Restructuring Fund is in charge of avoiding the abovementioned threats for
the respective credit institutions and for the financial market system as a
whole.65 For this, it has its own right to examine whether a particular credit
institution fulfills the requirements of systemic relevance; however, it is to
be assumed that this evaluation will be done in close cooperation with
BaFin, which, as previously mentioned, has the same right. If the
Restructuring Fund comes to a positive conclusion, the respective credit
institution has no claim on its own for support (i.e., it is left to the Fund’s
discretion as to whether to help). Moreover, in principle, support can be
61. Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz [RStruktFG] [Statute for the Restructuring Fund], Dec. 9,
2010, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1921 (Ger.) [hereinafter ReStF].
62. BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZMARKTSTABILISIERUNG, http://www.fmsa.de/en/ (last
visited Jan. 18, 2012).
63. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c.
64. See Hans-Jürgen A. Feyerabend, Stephan Behnes & Marcus Helios, Finanzierung des
Restrukturierungsfonds durch die Bankenabgabe, 64 DER BETRIEB [DB], supplement 4, 38, 38
(2011). See also DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 17/3024 (Ger.).
65. Pannen, supra note 37, at 2029 (recognizing a problem in that all credit institutions are
bound to contribute payments to the Restructuring Fund but only the systemically relevant are
potential recipients of support). Every financial institution, however, has at least the potential of
systemic relevance. Id.
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provided just for such credit institutions which are transferees of the
abovementioned transfer order of BaFin. This excludes, e contrario, any
support of a failing institution or the transferor.66
Pursuant to section 3, paragraph 2 of the ReStF, the Restructuring Fund
is granted a pool of four measures, under the ReStF, by which it may fulfill
its tasks: the foundation of bridge institutions and acquisition of shares,
section 5; guarantees, section 6; recapitalization, section 7; and other
measures, section 8. Accordingly, bridge institutions can be founded
without any existing particular need in order to keep them in stock. If there
is an important interest of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Restructuring Fund is permitted to acquire shares of the transferee. This
form of state involvement has its roots in the case of the Hypo Real Estate
Holding AG which, in 2009, finally became nationalized and is now held
by the Fund. Another way of supporting a transferee is the Fund’s ability to
issue guarantees for the transferee’s debentures for a period of up to sixty
months.67 The ceiling on such guarantees is €100 billion.68
Pursuant to section 7 of the ReStF, an important interest of the Federal
Republic of Germany is again necessary in order to support the transferee
by helping with recapitalization (i.e., improving the credit institution’s
equity). This help, however, comes with a “bitter pill”69: the annual salary
of any board member and employee is limited to €500,000.70 Whether this
really sets the right incentives for any credit institution to step in as
transferee of a failing bank in a case of highest urgency is highly doubtful.71
The “other measures” mentioned in section 8 of the ReStF are not meant to
be a free ticket for any other imaginable kind of support; rather, they are
ancillary measures that complement those aforementioned.
4. Statute of Limitations
The final tool is a seemingly tiny change to the existing law, which
nonetheless, is based on insightful psychological considerations. For
Aktiengesellschaften (joint stock companies) which are either credit
institutions or are listed, the existing five-year statute of limitations for
claims resulting from the management’s liability is prolonged to ten years.
The reasons given for this amendment are (1) that more time is available for
investigating respective claims, and (2) that the personal composition of the
respective body might have changed within such time. The latter takes into
account a possible, if not likely, reason for many companies’ past
66. Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 287 (providing a justified criticism against this
provision).
67. ReStF, supra note 61, § 6, para. 2 (Ger.).
68. Id.
69. The same is also true for the abovementioned acquisition of shares. See id. § 4, para. 3.
70. Id.
71. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 288.
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forbearances to claim damages from their managers—managers and
supervisors might have been too closely interconnected. In such cases, the
following motto might prevail: One crow does not peck the other’s eyes
out. Since the regular office period of the supervisors (Aufsichtsrat) is about
five years, the chances to claim damages increase when the statute of
limitations is extended to ten years.
B. THE EVALUATION
This new package of legislation should be welcomed in many respects.
It renders significant help to enhance rescue culture in Germany, it deviates
from trodden paths, and it tries to discipline financial institutions. A number
of features are innovative and have the potential to develop into important
instruments of future financial markets. And it was—and still is—a highly
visible sign that the legislature is ready to do something about banking
failures. Insofar as commentators discover (or believe they have discovered)
certain deficiencies in the various regulations, it is in most cases justified to
be confident that the German judicature will find ways to get things right—
it has done so before in innumerable cases.
Yet, a few features are more fundamental than merely technical; they
concern the concept of the new legislation as a whole. Criticism here
appears to be serious. This is true for the ReStF’s approach to abstain
completely from assisting a failing credit institution.72 The idea that support
should be given exclusively to the transferee and never to a transferor might
seem theoretically sound; but in practice, it is to be feared that the
rigorousness of this concept will work to accelerate crises. This follows
from the fact that BaFin has no ability to impose a reorganization
proceeding on a tumbling financial institution, and that the Restructuring
Fund has to hold back its support until a transfer order has been made and a
new institution is taking over. Not only may much precious time be lost by
this point, but also the transfer in itself will be viewed by the general public
as an eminent warning signal that the affairs of the transferor have certainly
gone awry. By this point, it will be clear to everyone on the market that
there is a big problem. Accordingly, at least some more flexibility for the
Fund would have been preferable.
Another even more fundamental deficiency of the new law is that which
it has in common with countless other examples of reactionary legislation—
namely, it attempts to solve the problem without addressing its root. In
other words, this law, again, cares about the symptoms rather than about the
cause. Admittedly, this is easier said than transformed into a legislative
reality. Yet, if there is such a strong emphasis on the systemic relevance in
this statutory package, one would expect at least some concern about the
notorious issue of “too big to fail.” This phenomenon—and in particular,
72. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 470.
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the corresponding moral hazard problem which seduces managers to ignore
economic risks—is likely one of the most important roots of the last crisis,
and of many earlier ones as well. The ReSt, however, does not address this
issue irrespective of the fact that the law’s exclusive concentration on the
financial institutions’ sector would have made it somewhat easier to come
to grips with this problem. Some might see the abovementioned transfer
order by BaFin as a tool to minimize size and thus, to prevent the creation
of institutions that are “too big to fail”; but the operation of this instrument
comes too late for preventing a credit institution from becoming too big.
Zimmer and Fuchs,73 in contrast, describe three areas (living wills, closeout
netting, and clearing through central counterparties) in which regulators
could exercise control for the benefit of mitigating the systemic risk. And
Schuster,74 for instance, discusses the (primarily constitutional) legitimacy
of regulatory measures in order to avoid the growth of a financial institution
into systemic relevance.
These are just a few examples of a much broader discussion in
Germany about the ReSt and its effects, but they should suffice to
demonstrate that the problems are broader than the law leads one to believe.
It is regrettable that the legislature failed to seize this opportunity for reform
when, at the same time, the new law already brings with it many
innovations.
CONCLUSION
The new Restructuring Statute is the German reaction to the shock
waves of the Lehman bankruptcy and the ensuing financial crisis. It tries to
cope with numerous problems which became visible at some German
banks, too, in the aftermath of that event. Likely due to the uniqueness of
that event, the German legislature decided, at least in part, to enter new
ground; in particular, it offered a combination of tools for the relevant
institutions to use on a voluntary basis and tools for the regulators. Yet, the
main issue in this context—the “too big to fail” phenomenon—is not
addressed at all. This is a serious omission as it is very much at the heart of
the problem. It is ominous that further crises and much more public
discussion will be necessary before this central phenomenon will receive
the urgently needed legislative attention that it requires.

73. See Zimmer & Fuchs, supra note 9, at 597.
74. Klaus J. Hopt, Peter O. Mülbert, Arne Wittig & Gunnar Schuster, “Too Big to Fail” als
Rechtsproblem, 63 DER BETRIEB [DB], supplement Standpunkte, 71, 71 (2010) (Ger.). See
generally PATRICK S. KENADJIAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL – BRAUCHEN WIR EIN
SONDERINSOLVENZRECHT FÜR BANKEN? (Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2012)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the “too big to fail” issue).

